

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



ANZUS AND NORTHEAST ASIAN
ALLIANCE COHESION

BY

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<p>The anti-nuclear policies of New Zealand have caused major changes in ANZUS and each member state's relationships with the other two. Differences between New Zealand and the United States over nuclear policy persist and are likely to remain a sore point bilaterally. There is little prospect of ANZUS returning to the status quo ante. Against that background it is important for Americans to understand why New Zealanders adhere to their policies and grasp why those policies, and the rationale behind them are relevant for alliance cohesion in Northeast Asia.</p>					
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ANZUS AND NORTHEAST ASIAN ALLIANCE COHESION

The ANZUS defense pact long was considered the West's most stable and non-controversial postwar treaty. That widespread perception was soundly shaken as a consequence of decisions taken by the New Zealand Labour Party under Prime Minister David Lange in 1985 that disrupted the harmony guided by John Muldoon and his predecessors, and by subsequent U.S. reactions. Since then ANZUS has drawn a level of attention by all three parties to it that they had never devoted previously. Books and articles have proliferated in the late 1980s relative to the scant coverage previously prevailing. This study will not attempt to replicate those analyses, but will draw on them.¹ The author does not claim any prior significant expertise in ANZUS affairs or in other aspects of Australian/New Zealand issues. He is a specialist in Northeast Asian affairs and U.S. security policy.² Therefore, this analysis will not dwell on the ways in which ANZUS has changed, is changing, or may resolve its differences, with an intent to pontificate about ANZUS to the officials or publics of any of the three parties. The focus is on what the evolution of ANZUS relationships may mean generically for *other* U.S. security ties in the Western Pacific,³ especially in Northeast Asia.

The meaning of ANZUS for other U.S. defense relationships can be examined through several levels of analyses. One can examine policy spillover, parallels, and precedents. One also can discern parallels and commonalities in the roots of each party's policies. Lastly, one can examine the similarities between ANZUS' multilateral changes and its interaction within the broader regional and global contexts, and the equivalents in other treaty relationships. In order to do

so one must first make some judgments about what has transpired, is occurring, and may happen within ANZUS. That portion of this study draws on the already cited recent studies, numerous published background analyses, and a series of off-the-record interviews by the author with American, Australian, and New Zealand officials, ex-officials, and scholars. Needless to say, those individuals bear no responsibility for the conclusions reached here and none are quoted directly.

When research for this project began the major theme was assumed to be the ways in which the so-called New Zealand disease, or Kiwi virus, might contaminate or infect other American allies. This notion -- with its clear and simplistic overtones of the domino theory during the Vietnam War -- remains an element in the analyses presented here, but only one part of it. That thesis does have some relevance for certain U.S. allies and friends -- especially Japan -- where anti-nuclear sentiments run high. It also has relevance for U.S.-Australian relations because of an effort by anti-nuclear activists to push Canberra toward the same sort of policy. So far that effort appears to have borne little fruit. Nonetheless, it is latent there and could spread if Washington and Canberra do not preempt it skillfully. While the author was in Australia during July 1988 on a U.S.I.A. lecture tour he heard an apparently obscure peace movement song on the state TV network (ABC) in which the repeated lyric was "if the Kiwi can stand up to the Eagle, why can't the Kangaroo too?" That issue will be covered here, but not in the simple sense of contagion. That aspect of ANZUS' impact will be subsumed within a broader context of issues that require starting with a description and assessment of why ANZUS changed. Following that appraisal, sections on ANZUS' meaning for Northeast Asia will follow.

ANZUS IN FLUX

ANZUS started as a response to Western defeat of the Japanese Empire. As the United States resuscitated postwar Japan the only two ethnically western states in the Pacific wanted reassurances that their interests would be heeded by the American superpower as the U.S. government arranged other alliance structures protecting countries from real or potential communist threats. There was little or no sense of direct military threat to either Australia or New Zealand from those sources at that time. That was not the point of ANZUS; it was intended to integrate Australia and New Zealand into the very broad security network the United States was fostering to replace the shattered safety net formerly provided by the British Empire. In this sense ANZUS was a surrogate security blanket for Australians and New Zealanders to replace a British-oriented system they had once relied upon and with which they had identified themselves. The latter was profoundly true of New Zealand, whereas the Australians long had felt varying degrees of ambiguity about those "home country" lies. The overt initial focus on reassurances that Japan would not rebound as a tangible threat soon lost its immediacy. Only the most suspicious individuals within the ANZUS countries still cling to that pretext in the late 1980s, though it could resurface should events in Japan someday take a now highly unlikely dramatic turn for the worse leading that country to renewed aggression.

The more important military rationale for ANZUS during the 1950s, '60s, and '70s became a collective security vehicle to cope with communist threats. It was never actually used in those terms in any formal sense, though all the ANZUS states contributed militarily to anti-communist military efforts. The Vietnam War best symbolizes this sort of cooperation. It also marked the

beginnings in Australia and New Zealand, as it did in the United States, of serious popular questioning of the long term wisdom of collective security and an anti-communist crusade. Despite such questioning, ANZUS survived those decades and in most respects flourished. Politically and economically ties among the three states were very strong. Everybody seemed to be benefitting. One aspect gnawed at ANZUS, however, namely: what was its military purpose? Over the years its essence had become vague and seemingly it was whatever the eyes of the beholder wanted it to be. In the broadest sense it was the embodiment of the "Free World" and "Nuclear Umbrella" systems of collective security that linked the United States as a nexus with disparate allies worldwide. In these terms the United States was the guarantor, at relatively low cost and minimal risks, of regional security for two culturally and politically very compatible -- if far flung -- allies. Australia and New Zealand bore even smaller costs and risks. Of the two regional allies Australia bore more in that regard, but New Zealand certainly was on the margins. Overall, it appeared to be an extraordinarily good deal for everyone concerned because there was so little chance that ANZUS would ever be invoked.

Unfortunately, ANZUS was so taken for granted by all sides that little effort was devoted to reconciling the niggling doubts about its military purposes. In retrospect, the most serious area of neglect clearly was the nuclear issue. Precisely because there was, and is, so little prospect that nuclear war -- theater or general -- would start or escalate to involve the United States in the Southwest Pacific, it was easy for Americans to slight local anti-nuclear sentiments. Similarly, there was virtually no risk that nuclear arms proliferation would spread to Australia, much less New Zealand. Neither state has shown any signs of aspiring to nuclear-armed status. Consequently, given other pressing issues, few

Americans saw much need to "fix" ANZUS and redefine what it stood for when its qualities of vagueness seemed well suited for an open-ended relationship. There were, however, signs of change, centering on New Zealanders' growing popular sentiment in favor of an anti-nuclear stand by their government that dated to about 1963.

Other governments had faced comparable domestic pressures and not succumbed by converting those pressures into a rigid requirement. Japan stands out most pointedly in that regard. Actually, Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment was a stimulus to New Zealand. Tokyo's "three non-nuclear principles" (neither possess, store, or allow the transit of nuclear weapons) was an explicit precedent for New Zealand's anti-nuclear activists. The key difference, of course, was that Japan chose to finesse the specifics and not routinely press for compliance with them from the United States. New Zealand did too for some time, but with the advent of the left-of-center Lange government that all changed suddenly. Wellington made it a point of principle that it had to know the details of their nuclear status before sanctioning occasional visits by U.S. Navy ships. The United States, in turn, was unwilling to compromise *its* principles about "neither confirming nor denying" whether any particular vessel was actually part of the worldwide forces constituting the euphemistic "nuclear umbrella" that sheltered diverse allies. American authorities were as prepared as New Zealanders to stand on their principles and allow a test case to measure the will of its ally.

The result was the controversial rejected visit of the U.S.S. Buchanan in February 1985. That episode and the subsequent parting of the ways between the United States and New Zealand on ANZUS related issues (most other relations remain as amicable as ever) are the key actions that have so dramatically altered ANZUS. New Zealand remains in ANZUS, but only willing to cooperate on its

stridently non-nuclear terms. The net result is that its formal membership has been reduced to a de facto non-member because it is excluded from tri-party activities. It only is a full member regarding the Australia-New Zealand (ANZAC) leg of the triangle and even that leg is constrained by Australia's inability to share with New Zealand those facets of the ANZUS relationship which devolve on to Australia from the United States.

When this rupture in the alliance initially emerged the United States and New Zealand were routinely and markedly sharp of tone in their senior officials' comments about each other. Reagan administration officials did not hold back in expressing their annoyance and anger with the Lange Government. The latter more than held its own as verbal sparks flew. At times it seemed as though the acrimony was intentional, calculated on each side to make a point. That is, the United States wanted to let all countries that might contemplate a Kiwi-like decision know what sort of price they would have to pay. The New Zealanders, in turn, seemed equally determined to shout out their defiance so that their message would be heard loudly and the world would know that New Zealand had survived U.S. recriminations intact. This was a bleak period in U.S.-New Zealand relations.

Both governments have been replaced by ones headed respectively by President Bush and Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer. Though neither side has yielded on its principles or positions, time and new personnel (who have had more opportunity to think over their actions and counteractions) *do* appear to have permitted the situation to mellow slightly. That appearance is somewhat misleading because the issue remains fundamentally unresolved and the gap is just as wide, perhaps wider as each side has grown accustomed to the two positions and elaborated upon them.⁴ In effect, the rupture's dynamic factors are no

longer as "hot" in any of the three countries and have been stalemated as each learned to live with the other's position and -- equally important -- *without* the other as the sort of partner it once was. So far, this development is the most important facet of ANZUS operating under constraints imposed by its smallest member. How this came to be, and to be accepted, will be the focus of the remainder of this first section. A number of themes will be examined. The order of their treatment does not necessarily reflect the order of their importance.

As one explores the roots of change within ANZUS stimulated by New Zealand one confronts many themes which have echoes elsewhere in the Pacific and some which are unique to New Zealand. To dispense with basics first, there is no other relatively important country on earth that is more geographically remote and far removed from the geopolitical action which shapes the modern world. Had New Zealand not been a hyper-loyal part of the British Empire that produced generations of Kiwis who were prepared to march off to distant regions of the world to fight and die for the Crown (in large numbers on a per capita basis) up through World War II, there would never have been an external threat sufficient to seriously endanger its people. Even Japan's Southwest Pacific exploits in World War II did not touch the New Zealanders' psyche the way it did to Australians. The only relatively serious armed threats to New Zealand were internal struggles between the British-Scottish settlers and polynesian Maoris who had spread south to the two large islands generations previously.

Reminiscent to Americans of the Indian wars on the western frontier, those conflicts yielded ethnic tensions which still plague modern New Zealand. Clearly, in that regard, New Zealand's domestic situation is far more acute than that of the United States because its "native" minority is a far larger percentage of New

Zealand society, has no significant rival domestic minorities, and is reinforced by cultural kin in the Pacific neighborhood. Aside from such artificially fostered external threats stimulated by loyalty to the British Empire and now historical domestic armed threats, contemporary New Zealanders have to think very creatively to visualize anything on any conceivable horizon which they can deem a military "threat." In short, territorially and militarily New Zealand possesses about as much natural security as any nation on earth could possibly want.

Americans, with their history of isolationist sentiments fostered by the advantages of living far from major power centers, which in the pre-nuclear age could scarcely threaten the United States' homeland, should -- but do not -- find it easy to empathize with the sense of security created by geographical remoteness. The age of Soviet *glasnost* permitted a senior Soviet official, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, to candidly point this out to a mass American audience: "The U.S. should thank God for its geographic position. Such threatening neighbors it has - - Canada and Mexico! Don't print that. I don't want to offend the Canadians and Mexicans. The point is that Americans are living in safety. Except for nuclear weapons, an enemy cannot reach the U.S."⁵ New Zealanders feel that sense of geographic security in an even more profound way and believe their country is most threatened by nuclear defenses within ANZUS, hence their opposition to that specific aspect of ANZUS.

In short, it is very easy for the Kiwis to be inordinately cavalier about the protestations of Americans, Australians, or any other U.S. ally that its actions jeopardize collective security in the generic sense. Such a rupture in an alliance instigated by virtually any other state would precipitate a far more legitimate charge that it was acting irresponsibly. In New Zealand's case, however, its actions do not demonstrably injure the security of any state including itself. Its

former contributions to ANZUS were never so significant that their lack disrupts anything that is crucial to any circumstance. Having acknowledged this unique strategic situation which makes any attempt by other states to do precisely the same thing a far more dangerous prospect, there is -- nevertheless -- reason to view Wellington's assertion of its views within an alliance as a phenomenon which has roots which the United States may well confront elsewhere. It is these roots which may constitute themes and commonalities that could cause strains in the cohesion of an array of Pacific alliances.

Probably the most profound theme which the Kiwis exemplified, and which echoes throughout the Asia-Pacific region, is nationalism. It is axiomatic that each nation's nationalism is distinct from all other's, with particular characteristics. It is helpful to understand some of the characteristics of Kiwi nationalism and how it influenced the changes in ANZUS so that one might discern parallels with nationalism's influence on alliances elsewhere. New Zealand nationalism is composed of many elements. One which echoes elsewhere is that it is simultaneously old yet new. New Zealand is a young country compared to many Asian states. But, then so are Australia and the United States. All of them are offshoots of British imperialism and colonialism. However, New Zealand's historical ties with the United Kingdom are significantly different. It certainly never revolted like Americans, nor did it harbor the sorts of Pommy-bashing frustrations that the Australians did because of that country's legacy of prisoner-cum-founding fathers, large dose of Irish Catholics, and greater diversity of European origins. In short, the majority of New Zealand society was, and is, much more homogeneous. That nation, which for so long did not dwell on the bi-culturalism which New Zealand today officially stresses, found its original nationalism within its British-Scotch heritage. New Zealand elites may

have shared with their Americans counterparts a vague sense that their "descent" from the British system was actually a form of "accent," but they also shared much more profoundly and for many years a degree of loyalty to the Crown that North Americans display only in Canada, and eastern Canada at that. As a consequence New Zealand nationalism amounted to warmed over British nationalism for many generations. It was not until the British-led global system collapsed upon itself in the wake of World War II that the Kiwis (and to a lesser extent the Australians) were compelled to come to grips with what it really meant to be a New Zealander or Australian and what their national interests -- separate from those of a protective superpower -- really are. That process was gradual in both countries and each reached different conclusions in the area of security interests, but the urges to seek answers were similar and echo elsewhere.

While New Zealand stressed issues such as opposition to nuclear weapons and power, anti-militarism, environmentalism, and left-of-center utopian strategic concepts (if they can actually be called that) which are suffused with a stop-the-world-I-want-to-get-off sort of naivete, Australia also engaged in some serious rethinking. Canberra's conclusions about its limited ability to project power into forward areas certainly led to a form of retrenchment and reconfiguring of its strategy, forces, and budget. Interestingly these hard-headed, candid, and realistic reassessments⁶ produced radically different critiques of Australia from the opposite ends of the U.S.-New Zealand political spectrum. Critics on the U.S. center-right, who were already agitated by what they considered Kiwi perfidy and irresoluteness jumped on the Aussies for starting down the path to national self-evisceration created by the Lange government. Australia was accused of going isolationist and worse. The New Zealand left,

however, looking at exactly the same developments discerned Australian militarism as alive and well.

Ironically, Australia's decisions -- and, in an incredibly perverse respect, even the Lange government's decisions -- were a protracted response to the pressures exerted by the United States via the Nixon Doctrine. Asia-Pacific allies of the United States were supposed to assume more responsibility for their own destiny. Both Australia and New Zealand have done precisely that, though in entirely different ways. If it were not for New Zealand's far more radical and thorough-going pursuit of autonomy in decision-making and its strategy, which made Australia's decisions and actions look comparatively prudent, Washington might well have reacted as adversely toward Canberra's shifts. The truly important and overarching facet of both allies' moves is that they were taken in response to nationalistic domestic pressures to carve out distinct roles for each country and *not* to spite the U.S. or to disrupt the Western world's security.

In light of the latter point, it is, however, worth noting the role of each country's attitudes toward international hierarchicalism and "big powers." ANZUS, even in its prime, was never a symmetrical arrangement. There is no way any arrangement between a superpower, a medium size regional power, and a small state can be truly equal. Naturally the three parties in ANZUS put the best possible light on the asymmetrical disparities in their size, stature, and clout in order to maintain harmony. It was that desire for harmony which injected the political will which made it as effective as it was. Moreover, it also gave Australia and New Zealand considerable influence in Washington. This was particularly true for New Zealand which contributed the least to ANZUS and arguably was most successful at translating that minimal contribution into maximum access to shaping decisions which effected it. Those who opposed

ANZUS on nuclear grounds were not convinced of that and argued for a policy shift because, in their opinion, New Zealand was getting little in return for the risk of being allied to a nuclear power whose global policies appeared to those critics to make New Zealand a potential nuclear target of U.S. adversaries.

Regardless of the shaky logic of that argument, such New Zealand critics unduly discount the leverage Wellington gained by being a full member of ANZUS. While it is plausible to charge that the United States did not heed New Zealand's anti-nuclear activists, it proves little about New Zealand's former influence. What state, even among the largest allies of the United States, can realistically hope to change basic United States policies which are adopted in view of U.S. interests. They may be able to chip away at the edges, but that is all. In fact, New Zealand was an active participant in ANZUS decisions and arguably a decisive voice when it came to Southwest Pacific island-oriented issues which loom large to Wellington, but are relatively minor for Washington. New Zealand's small but routine participation in ANZUS structures and associated liaison positions gave it a presence that was far from commensurate with its small capabilities or potentials. In practice, New Zealand was able to help shape much larger policy issues from within ANZUS than it can hope to today, despite its efforts to focus on unilateral forms of power. As a consequence New Zealand has lost the facade it once possessed in the eyes of many Asian and European states and is now much more widely seen for what it has always been: a small, remote, largely agricultural state with few claims to "greatness" except in the eyes of neighboring Pacific island micro-states.⁷

To be sure, few New Zealanders see things this way. From their point of view, they have accomplished a great deal by their actions that meet the needs of their national aspirations. To understand what causes this different view, one

must examine the problems New Zealanders experienced as the smallest member of a three-way pact. New Zealand clearly chafed in its role. It found itself in the shadow of two big powers. To Americans who often lump Australia and New Zealand into the same "down under" category, this Kiwi perception may seem odd. Nonetheless, Kiwis are acutely conscious that Australia looms larger in world affairs than New Zealand does. To Kiwis Australia is a big power.

Though there are many similarities between the two countries, there are as many differences. At the risk of caricaturing these differences, some comparisons are in order. New Zealand is a complicated cultural mixture of England, Scotland, and Polynesia, situated in a geographic mix of the sub-tropics, sparsely populated verdant pasture lands, and remote Alpine ranges edged by fjords. The scenic diversity is marked with rural pockets that remind an American of an Appalachian hollow. All of this is governed from Wellington -- a small, hilly capital which strikes one as a Calvinist San Francisco -- by a Labour Party which is so bound up by its hard-left wing that it seems like the Berkeley City Council writ large. Under Labour's guidance New Zealand is in transition from its British Empire past and Commonwealth present toward a vague new status as a Pacific island "super" state, while tweaking the noses of Australia and the United States.

In short, New Zealand is intent upon shedding its role as an Anglo-phone outpost of a dead empire and becoming a big-power-distrusting Pacific state, based in part upon its still ambiguous commitment to making the Maori portion of its society an asset. It hopes to overcome a legacy of racism and foster a bi-cultural society able to play a key role closer to home. The wisdom of this effort remains to be seen, but there are concerted efforts to address Maori and Pakeha (European-New Zealander) concerns, push New Zealand's polynesian identity,

and integrate New Zealand (or *Aotearoa*) into its region. The more idealistic see this in economic and social terms, while those of a more hard-nosed persuasion are confident that New Zealand's small armed forces with many Maoris in their ranks will be large enough, and acceptable enough to other island peoples, to be an effective stabilizing presence. Moreover, they think New Zealand is capable of playing a valuable -- if small -- role in preserving regional peace and stability through largely non-military means.⁸

All of these particulars have little specific relevance for other U.S. alliances in the Pacific, but they are important because they set the stage for New Zealand's assertion of its views versus Australia and the United States as "big powers" who seem domineering at best and bullying at worst to many New Zealanders. To put this into context one has to note the gap between New Zealand and Australia. The latter is a very different country in scale, scope, and history. Australia is a more complicated society composed of multiple ethnic groups, but still shaped by its ambiquity toward their attenuated ties with the United Kingdom. Australians clearly are more ready than the Kiwis to shed their post-British Empire identity. They are far more tolerant of, and often enthusiastic about, being part of an interdependent Western system that is replete with the attributes of American-style popular culture. In part this seems to be because the Aussies can see evidence that they (unlike New Zealanders) are active contributors to international modes and fashions which may be called "American" in some circles but actually have their origins in many countries in Europe and some in the Asia-Pacific region -- notably Japan. Australians feel integral to those trends -- albeit not at the center -- in ways that accentuate New Zealand's status on the fringes. Consequently, when bolstered by Australia's far more diverse and interdependent economic relations with an array of Pacific rim states,

one is struck by the breadth, depth, and cosmopolitanism of Australia's international perspective compared to New Zealand's relative parochialism. Australia now seems afflicted with certain (Japan-centered) ambiguities about where to place its overall emphasis: on the U.S. end of the Pacific rim or its East Asian portions.⁹ On balance, however, Australia seems confident that it is a player in those leagues. New Zealand does not. Moreover, Australia does not conceal its relative status versus New Zealand, dealing with the latter as a poor -- if genteel -- cousin who does not show suitable gratitude for all that Australia does as an intermediary and buffer. This is aggravated by the economic asymmetries between Australia and New Zealand.

This complex of relations has produced deep-seated frictions between the two neighbors that yield Aussie arrogance and condescension which is amply responded to by Kiwi frustration, resentment, and chafing. One prominent New Zealander, in a conversation with the author, referred to these relations as replete with "spikiness." To many New Zealanders the Australian big brother syndrome is far more palpable, and likely to be acted upon, than any U. S. superpower leverage or threats. The net result is that New Zealand's place within ANZUS was fraught with nuances that were barely noticed by most Americans but nonetheless motivated the Kiwis to take independent strategic actions which were not merely focused on the United States' role in ANZUS, with some overt displays of anti-Americanism, but were intended to send discrete messages to *Australia* about what New Zealand thought was best for their part of the world.¹⁰

The significance of these developments is major because it suggests shifts which are in evidence within other U.S. alliances. Whether one examines New Zealand's anti-nuclear, "anti-American," and Green-tinged policies or Australia's redefinition of a more autonomous form of defense, one is confronted by a

similar desire for co-equality status within an alliances' decisionmaking. Aussie independence and Kiwi assertiveness demonstrate a desire on both sides of the Tasman Sea to move away from a traditional tight alliance structure and toward a looser form of soft alignment in which all parties' views are heeded more than they were formerly. Sometimes these manifest themselves with explicit or implicit anti-American overtones which have echoes in other U.S. alliances that are evolving toward greater parity. When intensified by the "spikiness" of asymmetrical alliance partners and willingness of smaller allies to stand up to large allies in defense of more strongly (or newly) felt national interests, new tensions emerge which transform the former status quo. As each side adjusts, perhaps reluctantly, to the obdurateness of the other(s), the alliance becomes redefined in a de facto sense and -- probably -- in time in a de jure sense.

This is where ANZUS is, and is heading, today. It is being recast by its smallest member according to its desires. Americans and Australians often question that result. Some conservatives in the United States and a few in New Zealand persist in the hope that a political sea change in Wellington, which sees the National Party replace the Labour Party, will cause a return to something which approximates the pre-Lange status quo ante. Though not impossible, particularly if a regional threat were to materialize, it seems extraordinarily unlikely. Too much has transpired for such a full reversal to another Muldoon era to be judged at all likely. Public opinion in New Zealand, including supporters of the "Nats," seems too firmly committed to the changes put in place by Lange. Actually, and incredibly perverse though it may be, the obdurate toughness of Washington's policy responses to Wellington's rupture of ANZUS seems to have changed the terms of reference in the alliance debate.

United States actions compelled New Zealanders (in their minds) to take a clearer eyed view of the threat potential around them, make decisions about how important military security actually is to New Zealand, and reconfirm a predisposition toward doubt as to its value to New Zealand. Consequently, New Zealand today is *more* committed to its anti-nuclear and anti-military postures than it was while ANZUS was starting to unravel. New Zealand is concurrently *less* interested in reviving ANZUS precisely because U.S. retaliatory policies have underscored to New Zealanders the ways in which they do not really need what ANZUS once did for them. Doing without U.S. defense cooperation seems to them to work fine, so what incentive is there to go against their principles and resurrect former structures which seem designed to serve primarily the interests of the United States and Australia?

Aside from very conservative New Zealanders, who seem largely discounted by their countrymen and women (a crucial element in a polity where feminism now looms large), few expect to see the clock turned back. American perceptions of the New Zealand political scene appear to be unrealistically skewed by minority New Zealand views which keep alive what should be seen as fading hopes for ANZUS' full renaissance. Those Americans whose views and writings¹¹ help generate that continuing expectation cannot be blamed too harshly because they are seeking to cultivate those sectors of New Zealand society which might foster trend reversals which would benefit the United States' existing policy. One must remain sympathetic to their desires to a certain extent because a return to an approximation of the status quo ante *would* be the simplest answer for Americans to the myriad problems bedeviling the ANZUS relationship today. Having said that, however, one must hasten to add that perpetuating false expectations does not truly serve U.S. long term interests if there is virtually no

chance of making the tide go back. For better or worse, that seems to be the reality with which American officials must contend.

Conversely, New Zealanders also have to contend with the probability that American officials will cling to their hopes and apparently unjustified expectations for the foreseeable future. Kiwis are, in a sense, more at fault when it comes to perpetuating false expectations. As is so often the case in asymmetrical U.S. alliances, the smaller ally pays more attention to what is going on in the United States that might effect the ally than the American public or U.S. officials do to the ally. This is profoundly true in U.S.-New Zealand relations where a bare handful of Americans can be considered (by Americans, if not by New Zealanders) to be experts about ANZUS or broader New Zealand issues, whereas many among New Zealand's activist elites try to be well informed about U.S. policy toward their country. Despite that disparity, the Kiwis manage to keep alive their own share of false expectations about the ways that American peace activists or liberal Democrats will transform U.S. policy "when" (not "if") they gain access to power.

The author was struck by the readiness of a group of New Zealand undergraduate students, he had the privilege to listen to in the fall of 1989, to treat both moderate and conservative U.S. analysts of ANZUS affairs as representative of the United States' "hard right," showing little awareness that moderate-to-liberal American officials -- if they gain control of the White House -- would probably not rapidly change U.S. policy toward ANZUS to accommodate New Zealand's anti-nuclear posture. This tendency to harbor mutually false expectations, cultivate those in each other's country who reinforce misperceptions, and talk past each other is unfortunate, but all too real. More important, it is the root cause of the stalemate which characterizes the changes in

ANZUS. Like it or not, a small ally *can* transform an alliance if it is sufficiently persistent and motivated. New Zealand is and others may be too.

In an equally perverse way New Zealand's stubbornness and its ability to make the United States adjust to factors Americans could not control in a trilateral alliance is instructive in two other ways. By being the smallest party in a multilateral arrangement and effectively altering that arrangement, New Zealand has displayed an inverse form of power. New Zealand was a mouse that roared and was heard. The reason this "mouse" was heard have little to do with the intrinsic anti-nuclear message it was transmitting or American fears of that message being absorbed elsewhere. Instead, New Zealand was listened to because its security was, and is, more important to the third -- mid-ranking power -- than it was, and is, to the United States.

If New Zealand were to be conquered by a hostile state (however far fetched that notion may seem) the United States would feel little direct threat. New Zealand is much further from the United States than most territories now controlled or influenced by the Soviet Union. A heavily armed "People's Republic of New Zealand," however incongruous that prospect is, would pose no danger to the United States. Australia, however, does have reason to be concerned about anything which might endanger its cousins in the backyard. New Zealand may be remote to most of the world, but not to Australia. Virtually no one in Australia seems to lose any sleep over that imagined "danger" (save for the disruptive impact on ANZUS) but it is nonetheless true that it is New Zealand's importance to Australia which imbues it with indirect importance to the United States and provides it with leverage within ANZUS.

This phenomenon, when coupled with the need of all asymmetrical partners in security treaties with a superpower to stress vertical ties with that power at the expense of horizontal ties with other regional parties in the multilateral alliance, or those which have separate but similar vertical bilateral alliance ties, has enormous significance for all other U. S. alliances. Other relatively small U.S. allies can, and do, display parallel tendencies to play off the United States against the competing interests of other allies.

That general phenomenon has reached another plateau in ANZUS following Wellington's anti-nuclear shifts. The United States, which long had emphasized Australia over New Zealand, thereby contributing to the frustrations which motivated New Zealand's decisions that have altered ANZUS, responded to these alterations by *re-emphasizing* the Australian leg of ANZUS. This put major pressures on the Australia-New Zealand leg which have compelled those two allies to work even closer than they had previously. This has, in turn, forced Australia and New Zealand to increase their defense spending bilaterally to compensate for what the United States will no longer do for ANZUS as a trilateral arrangement. This increase reached a pinnacle, so far, in the debate over the so-called ANZAC frigates. These are four warships which New Zealand was pressured into buying -- two in the near term (as of 1989) and two in the future -- toward the late 1990s.¹²

This would be a relatively small decision for the United States, but is a truly major one for New Zealand which generated a new round of controversy that rankled Australian-New Zealand relations. Less visibly, it also precipitated new animosity toward the military aspects of the residual ANZUS relationships. Most important, however, it called attention once more to the differences in the

two operative legs of ANZUS and the degree of emphasis the United States now places on Australia. That emphasis ironically now gives Canberra an even larger voice in regional affairs -- partially at Wellington's expense. Though few Australians are likely to flaunt it, the changes in ANZUS clearly have benefitted Australia's influence over New Zealand and its stature in the eyes of Americans. That "benefit" is somewhat problematical because of the increased defense costs and responsibilities the Aussies had to assume as they took up most of the slack from weakened U.S.-New Zealand relations and because of heightened Kiwi resentment over Australian clout. On balance, however, contemporary Australia occupies a larger portion of the driver's seat in ANZUS than it ever has. This is, in practical terms, as much of a major change in ANZUS as is the change caused by New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy. Furthermore, it marks a type of shift within alliance cohesion which could have tremendous implications for other U.S. alliances in which allies play each other off against American policy.¹³

To bring this assessment of "ANZUS in flux" to some preliminary conclusions, one must run the risk of assessing its future. It seems clear that both the United States and New Zealand have gained and lost certain things as a consequence of changes in ANZUS. The United States can make a persuasive argument that it has not lost much of intrinsic value by not cooperating with New Zealand as much as it once did because the Kiwis never did much anyway. In absolute terms that is accurate, but the stridency with which the Kiwis have compelled the world's most powerful superpower to adjust a very visible treaty on the terms of a far weaker state cannot be ignored. To put the case in an Asia-Pacific cultural context, the U.S. has "lost face" as a result of New Zealand's ability to compel a stalemate on Kiwi terms.

The symbolic significance of these actions for the credibility of the United States is major. If Washington cannot persuade or coerce relatively weak Wellington to reverse course or -- at least -- back down a bit, how can it hope to resist the assertion of will by far more powerful or influential allies elsewhere? The setback Washington experienced on the nuclear issue may seem like the most important "loss" to many Americans, but -- without impugning the importance of the nuclear issue -- it is only symptomatic of a much more important phenomenon, namely the marked diminishment of the United States' ability to exert controlling influence over allies worldwide.

It is this international setting of rapid change which truly gives the shifts in ANZUS relationships their greatest meaning. Many New Zealanders seem confident that their government's anti-nuclear-focused policy challenge to the United States puts them far out in front of other countries as a pace-setter. Former Prime Minister Lange's widely publicized speech at Yale University, April 24, 1989 was singled out by American critics for its brinksmanship suggestions that New Zealand might cut all its ties with ANZUS and make formal what exists in practice.¹⁴ That speech also drew criticism in New Zealand because it had not been fully coordinated as an initiative. Nonetheless, that radical move may yet occur if the Labour Party retains power *and* is nudged by its powerful left wing toward an official stance of neutrality or nonalignment. It was, however, not the most important portion of his speech.

His emphasis on the ways in which New Zealand has changed the course of history and is leading the way toward a brighter non-nuclear future for the world was far more significant because it exemplified the desire of Kiwis to set a precedent that others will follow. It is rarely noticed by Americans, but New

Zealanders share with Americans a cultural trait in which both countries are eager to proselytize their values. De Toqueville is well known, in part, for calling attention to the American tendency to act as a missionary of sorts for their beliefs and for visualizing their country as a secular "city upon a hill" which will draw less enlightened peoples to it. In a much less noticed study New Zealand had its own "de Toqueville" who described remarkably similar desires and motives on the part of Kiwis¹⁵ who -- for all their Britishness -- nonetheless felt their way of life to be an improvement. It is not out of character, therefore, for contemporary New Zealanders to seek a relatively benign form of passive leadership -- pointing out a calmer, more rational, and less risky alternative that others might follow.

Consequently, what Americans often see as a series of losses for New Zealand (reduced influence and stature, more costly security, diminished defensive economies of scale, and the lack of superpower sanctioning for a strategic free ride), simply do not strike many Kiwis as serious losses. Many are happily rid of those supposed benefits because they feared the strategic costs and risks which came as part of the ANZUS package. Moreover, many Kiwis see such arguable "losses" as more than compensated for by the gains New Zealand has made in terms of self-reliance, reduced risks, national pride and confidence, the development of alternative approaches to security which stress economics and peace-keeping missions, peace of mind, and -- perhaps most important -- a pervasive sense that their approach is morally justified. It is the latter facet which injects such certainty into the Kiwi worldview and leads to their confidence that they really are leading the way.¹⁶

If their self-perceptions were totally accurate, the concerns of the more conservative critics of Lange and Palmer would be equally accurate. There

would, indeed, be reason to anticipate and try to preempt the "Kiwi virus" from spreading contagiously in a manner that could undermine U.S. alliances from NATO to Northeast Asia. Many Kiwis think they are ahead of the times in setting a precedent. Surely there are some signs that their anti-nuclear example has been noticed. The remaining two sections shall, in part, examine that principle. Even in the U.S. domestic context one can find significant examples of Kiwi-type anti-nuclear/nuclear-free-zone sentiments exerting a disruptive influence on the best laid plans of the U.S. Department of Defense. One is tempted to see the most publicized instance of a local U.S. government agency's confrontation with the U.S. federal authorities as an example which could be described as the Kiwi disease making the trip from Auckland to Oakland.¹⁷ There is an element of peace movement similarity, but -- on balance -- there are stronger influences at work.

New Zealanders' tendency to see themselves as ahead of the times often is privately lampooned by Americans and Australians who see their small ally as well behind the curve when it comes to picking up on the latest trends and fashions -- whether materially or intellectually. The anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand has struck some non-Kiwis as a late-arriving import from the 1960s. While there may be a grain of truth to such observations and biases, they should not be taken too seriously. There is a certain dated quality to Wellington's decisions, but the Kiwis are not as out of touch with reality as many appear to assume. Actually, the Kiwi judgment that their policies are ahead of the times probably is *correct*, albeit for radically different reasons than those which seem most prevalent in New Zealand. The Kiwis are "ahead" of most of the world and -- to the small extent they are noticed -- may actually be setting a precedent of sorts, but not on the terms assumed in New Zealand.

Similar ideas did circulate elsewhere in the 1960s and since, but stood little chance of flourishing because the times were utterly inhospitable to them. It is not that New Zealand's anti-nuclear notions are intrinsically any more palatable today to most of the allies affiliated with the United States, but those allies -- and the world in which they operate -- have become far more receptive to an ally of a superpower standing up to that power and asserting its positions. The international milieu has changed so dramatically because of the emerging "end" of the Cold War, the growth of multiple centers of power (primarily economic) which raise questions about the supremacy of superpowers, and a palpable decline in the armed tensions which have characterized the world since the late 1940s in a way that makes nuclear war seem far less imminent.

New Zealand's policy is sticking and seems to be causing changes in a key U.S. alliance *not* because of intrinsic merit (although that merit may well be credible and inspiring to many non-Kiwis, including Americans), but because it was implemented at a point when the United States was beginning to be less capable of compelling smaller allies to toe an American line. *This* is the sense in which the New Zealand decisions, and will to persist in them, have been precedent-setting. They established modes of behavior which are symbolic of, and parallel to, other alliances that are losing their cohesiveness.

Though scarcely noticed in overall U.S. policy, the Australian Ambassador to the United States, Rawdon Dalrymple made a speech in which he spelled out through a sports metaphor what has really happened in ANZUS that is profoundly important to the alliance. He said that, in effect, the U.S. coach has had to learn that the Aussies and Kiwis want, and expect, to be full partners in determining the game plan for ANZUS which the Americans "coach" then must

follow.¹⁸ Despite American reluctance to accept it, both allies have made this principle work; one by confrontation, the other by consultation. This shift in decision-making style, and in the authority of the United States, has tremendous implications for the cohesion of all other U.S. alliances -- particularly in the Pacific where there is more immediate awareness of the transformation of ANZUS -- but ultimately worldwide.

Northeast Asia: In Transition

None of the previous analysis of ANZUS can be transferred to the United States' Northeast Asia alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea in a literal manner. Societies and cultures are too particularistic for precise analogies to be drawn. Nevertheless, there are ways in which the ANZUS experience can be instructive about alliance cohesion in Northeast Asia. There are parallels which shall be addressed here. Some are very strong, and others are merely intriguing because of their potential to become more important. In the cases to be cited here, however, there is one underlying factor which Americans and our allies need to bear in mind, namely that the problems which have arisen within ANZUS can be articulated and comprehended by all three parties in English.

The existence of a common language facilitates communications and makes readily available -- to anyone in each country who cares enough about the problems to read, talk, and listen -- all the information and myths one could desire. Even so, there is a serious problem with mutual understanding and sensitivity among the ANZUS members. If that is so in such a relatively ideal communications situation, it is not difficult to imagine what kinds of misunderstandings can, and do, occur between the United States and allies such as

Japan and South Korea where the linguistic and cultural gaps impose immense barriers for those with the best of intentions in all three countries. For those who pay scant attention to, or are actively hostile toward these alliances, it is all too easy for that gap to seriously exacerbate existing and future problems.

As various issues of the magnitude which disrupted ANZUS emerge in U.S.-Japan, U.S.-ROK, and Japan-ROK relations, it is infinitely more difficult for them to be raised, perceived, understood, debated, and resolved in some fashion because of the lack of a common language. In an operational sense English does play that functional role in Northeast Asia, but that necessity injects a whole series of additional barriers and biases. Consequently, as comparisons between ANZUS and Northeast Asian alliance cohesion are made here one must recall that the Northeast Asian version of the problems could be infinitely more difficult to handle because of the linguistic barrier and everything which stems from that context.

The Impact of "Kiwi Virus"

Without doubt the most noticed parallel between ANZUS and the Northeast Asian alliances remains the possibility that the "Kiwi virus" might contaminate U.S. security relations with Japan and Korea.¹⁹ In each instance there is some reason to be concerned and many compensating reasons why that concern probably is unwarranted. There is linkage between the situation in Japan and Korea on the nuclear-free-zone issue that will be addressed below, but before examining those connections it is worthwhile assessing how the "virus" relates to each U.S. ally. By far the greatest relevance is to Japan.

As the first and only country to have experienced nuclear attacks Japan has certain obvious qualifications to harbor deep-seated views on nuclear issues. It is no secret that anti-nuclear sentiments are widespread and profound among those Japanese who perceive themselves as victims. Their "nuclear allergy" has been a major factor in domestic Japanese politics for years. This is not the place to provide a thorough review of that phenomenon in Japanese society, suffice it to say that Japan's security relations with the United States have been enormously complicated by Japanese reactions to what the United States -- as a nuclear power -- represents to Japan as a partner.²⁰

As already noted, Japan's famed "three non-nuclear principles" was one inspiration for New Zealand's policy shift. The Japanese experience with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, coupled with recurrent Japanese doubts about the nuclear portion of the American security shield which struck Japanese critics (who subscribe to the anpo makikomare thesis) as a means to entrap Japan within U.S. strategy by making it a magnet for Soviet attack, led the New Zealand left and peace groups to see Japan as a role model of sorts. It represented what they did not want to happen to New Zealand, either as a victim of nuclear attack or victim of a treaty which served another country's interests more than it did those of New Zealand. Consequently, New Zealand's anti-nuclear leaders consciously had Japan in mind when they took their steps to change ANZUS, seeking to do what Japan talked about doing but never actually put teeth into. Similarly, since 1985 there is ample evidence that the anti-nuclear element in New Zealand has had discreet but high hopes that the Kiwi example would help exert pressure within Japan to follow suit. For their part, the Japanese people have reacted in a divided manner to the de facto policy gauntlet thrown down by the Kiwis.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) did its best to ignore the issue, hoping that standard rhetorical responses about the three non-nuclear principles would suffice. The LDP had arduously weathered a previous controversy in 1981 when former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer gave two interviews to the Japanese press²¹ in which he went out of his way to expose the loopholes in the manner in which U.S. and Japanese officials handled the three principles. With such a prominent (and unquestionably pro-Japanese) American subjecting their policy to overt skepticism, the LDP and U.S. government had great difficulty reverting to the status quo ante, but they managed to finesse an approximation of it. Consequently the decision by the Lange government to put razor sharp teeth into its version of the same policy produced three key reactions in Japan. The Japanese press, especially the mainstream liberal press, had a field day in its coverage of Kiwi actions. The press knew it was a major embarrassment for the LDP to have a minor actor in international affairs enforce upon the United States what Japan had not dared do.²² Moreover, the fact that the Kiwis were considered by the Japanese to be close kin of the Americans on the broad spectrum of international affairs, and part of a key alliance in the Pacific security network, made the impact of Wellington's move that much more profound.

Anti-nuclear forces in the Japanese political arena were ecstatic about New Zealand's move. The Kiwis had their rapt attention and provided the Japanese peace movement with another precedent upon which they tried to build their case for enforcing rigidly Japan's non-nuclear policy. They added their voices to those of the Kiwis in an effort to embarrass the LDP. The changes in ANZUS clearly put the LDP and the United States on the hot seat. The dangers of the Kiwi disease seemed real because many Japanese harbor doubts about the wisdom of their present security arrangements. Although Japan is far more centrally

located in a geopolitical sense than New Zealand is, many Japanese share with the Kiwis major doubts about the logic of any country attacking their homeland if it were not part of the United States' security network. The Japanese Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency normally take a hard line in their formal assessments of Soviet capabilities and intention, but it is not echoed among the mass of Japan's scholars and journalists.

Consequently, they and the Japanese public do not feel in imminent danger of Soviet (or any other country's) attack, nor do they easily visualize it in the future. In this context of minimalist threat perceptions a correspondingly large share of Japanese consider the value of U.S.-Japan security relations to be problematical. They generally want to keep it going because it seems cost effective, their government says it warrants support, and -- so far -- has not attracted a magnet-like attack. However, they clearly are worried that U.S. policy toward South Korea, the assertiveness of the "Maritime Strategy" as developed in the Reagan-Lehman years, its readiness to treat Northeast Asia as a ploy in a Eurocentric world, and their place in the shadows of a U.S. "nuclear umbrella," collectively risk their security rather than enhancing it. Those themes are essentially the same concerns which motivated the Kiwis to reassess New Zealand's participation in a system that seemed to them more geared to U.S. interests instead of their own. Actually, on objective standards, the risks of this sort to Japan are appreciably greater to the Japanese than the utterly abstract dangers that the Kiwis thought they faced. It is entirely conceivable that Japanese, too, may look at these parallels and someday decide to take steps similar to those taken by the Kiwis.

Tokyo's responses were dual-tracked. At home the LDP relied on the orthodox party line and hunkered down, hoping the whole thing would blow

over. It was confident it could keep a lid on the domestic scene, and that the political prospects for any opposition party -- notably the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) -- which might be able to take advantage of the anti-nuclear issue were so poor that it stood virtually no chance of injecting the Kiwi virus into the Japanese polity. Abroad, Tokyo relied on the United States to control the damage which might be done by Washington's policy shift. Washington's hardline response to the Kiwis worked in that respect. The message was sent to other allies in Europe and Asia that the United States was deadly serious about preventing the "virus" from spreading to other alliances and that infections elsewhere could collectively make it very difficult for the United States to keep its commitments to an array of collective security arrangements. Central to that message was the risk of Japan's place in the western alliance network being undermined by this issue and what that, in turn, would imply for the U.S.-Soviet balance worldwide.

Throughout the late 1980s these measures seemed to be holding the line against contagion by the "virus." Though the United States and New Zealand were deadlocked, and the issue still loomed internationally, Washington and Tokyo had done their best to keep the issue from exacerbating U.S.-Japan security relations. That sense of restored stability was severely shaken by the LDP's political reverses at the hands of a revitalized Socialist party in July 1989. The JSP, under Ms. Takako Doi, was able to take advantage of LDP domestic problems with financial and sexual scandals and the public's unhappiness with the way the LDP had handled a domestic tax issue, to wrest control from the ruling party in the Upper House of the Diet. It also stands a chance, albeit still slim, amidst LDP confidence in stymying further Socialist gains, of deposing the LDP in the Lower House through elections due by mid-1990. This may yield a coalition

government in which the conservative wings of the LDP would be far less capable of preventing the anti-nuclear issue from becoming a test case a la New Zealand.

Should this actually occur in Japan, the parallels with the New Zealand experience would be profound, yet also profoundly more important in the global context.²³ Decoupling the United States from Japan over the nuclear issue -- reaching a Kiwi-style stalemate and agreement to disagree -- would have enormously greater consequences than the changes in ANZUS. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the keystone in the network of other Pacific alliances. A large portion of the rationales for those other alliances is predicated on U.S.-Japan cooperation and the United States doing in the region many things which defend Japan's interests. If U.S.-Japan security ties were to be ruptured over the anti-nuclear issue, who would perform these roles? Could the United States find a replacement for Japan? Probably more relevant, would it want to in a context in which Asia's most powerful state had decided to change the rules of the game so emphatically?

Were Japan to, in effect, opt out of the existing strategic framework which provides for prevailing stability in East, Northeast, and Southeast Asia, the area's military balance would be shaken to its foundation. Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean threat perceptions would be altered dramatically. Except for the most naive optimists, there are likely to be few analysts in the United States or among its other friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region who would be sanguine about the Soviet Union and North Korea, in particular, not maximizing their strategic advantages that would be made possible by Japan changing its nuclear policies so drastically. Such apprehensions are, of course, precisely what is so likely to prevent any Japanese government (even a full-fledged Socialist one)

from actually taking so precipitous a step. Japan's position in the world geopolitically is radically different from New Zealand's and Tokyo cannot afford to be as adventurous as Wellington has been. Were there to be another situation analogous to the U.S.S. Buchanan in New Zealand, in which a U.S. warship entering Tokyo Bay, for example, were to be made an overt test case of new-found Japanese will to put teeth into long standing non-nuclear principles, the prospective clash between Washington and Tokyo would dwarf what has occurred in ANZUS.

Because the risks are so high, and are in 1989-90 apparently growing somewhat more tangible as the JSP gains political clout, there is no doubt that the ANZUS precedent is instructive for both Japanese and American policymakers. Equally important, pertinent Japanese officials, scholars, and journalists are acutely aware of the relevance of what New Zealand's actions, and the repercussions the Kiwis have felt, are for Japan. Some on the left and in the peace movement in Japan seem willing to run those risks and visualize Japan going through the process with as much equanimity as the Lange and Palmer governments. Fortunately for U.S.-Japan security relations that view is a minority one and seems to have little chance of becoming a majority view anytime soon. Nonetheless, one should not be cavalier about the chance that it *could* gain credibility and persuasiveness as U.S.-USSR relations evolve toward reduced tensions and as Japanese become more assertive about their country's role in world affairs. This possibility is underscored by the reality that over nine hundred Japanese local government organizations, responsible for more than half of Japan's population, already have declared themselves nuclear-free zones.²⁴ This may not directly shape Japanese national policy, but it clearly will help set the stage for a potential policy shift should appropriate circumstances develop. In

these terms, the Japanese public, as of late 1989, seems ripe for a Soviet "peace campaign" in the early 1990s that would stress the desirability of nuclear-free zones, naval disarmament, and enforcing Japan's non-nuclear policies as building blocks in a process of creating peace.

Making Japan's options in these matters far more complicated than New Zealand's is another factor which never has been important in Wellington's calculations. Japan is an economic superpower with evident ambiguities about how far it should go toward fleshing out its power militarily. Despite a continuing debate over U.S.-Japan "burdensharing" and mixed perceptions of Japan's actual military strength,²⁵ one factor is certain: if Japan desired to build much stronger armed forces than it now possesses, it clearly has the capability to do so. That potential just as clearly extends to nuclear arms. As one contemplates the chances of the Kiwi "virus" spreading to Japan, one must also recall there is a very real countervailing tendency in Japanese society which would see Tokyo adopt policies that would make Japan a true nuclear-armed superpower. That tendency is reinforced by a much broader trend toward renewed acceptance of nationalistic fervor and pride. Fortunately, that tendency, too, seems to be as firmly on the fringe as the disciples of a Kiwi option. Marginal though it may be, however, it exists in Japan whereas it does not in New Zealand. Somewhat perversely such pro-proliferation thoughts in Japan imbue that country with a readiness to resist calculated Soviet overtures. The existence of a Japanese nuclear option is, in a sense, symbiotic with the Kiwi-style "virus" - they play off on each other. On balance, today, neither fringe seems to be going anywhere, but they remain possibilities which could become more viable if international circumstances were to change.

The ways in which those circumstances might theoretically change are infinite, but one area in which they loom relatively large is in neighboring Korea. Like Japan, Korea seems to be of two minds regarding the nuclear-free issue made so explicit by New Zealand. Neither North Korea nor South Korea generally are close followers of events in ANZUS. In North Korea's case, however, the nuclear issue has precipitated some overt official interest because what Lange et al did to the United States, to collective security principles, and for the anti-nuclear movement, meshes very well with Pyongyang's stated objectives. Consequently, North Korea has rooted from the far side lines for the Kiwi cause.²⁶

In South Korea, on the other hand, there is very little evidence that policymakers, scholars, or journalists are much aware of what has transpired in ANZUS.²⁷ The main exception to that statement seems to be on the part of the church-related peace activists in South Korea who have established relations with their Kiwi counterparts and clearly hope to learn how to do for the ROK-US relationship what the Kiwis did to ANZUS. Though this group is small, their connections with broader human rights and anti-government activist groups could --in time-- allow this sentiment to spread in the ROK too. Moreover, their voices are reinforced by South Korean analysts' tendency to treat the alleged presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea as an open secret. Despite U.S. officials' use of the "neither confirm nor deny" formula, and ROK officials formal acceptance of that phrasing, there is little day-to-day effort to obfuscate what many U.S. and Korean analysts assume to be a strategic "given."²⁸

This situation, though clearly not desired by either the U.S. or ROK governments is a reality against which anti-nuclear activists press their cause. So

far, this reality seems to have worked against the anti-nuclear activists because many South Koreans are well disposed toward the system that preserves their security in such a palpable manner. Conversely, should efforts for tension reduction in Korea ever generate serious North-South cooperation, it is almost certain that the visibility of the nuclear weapons issue in Korea would make it even less tractable than the issue once was in ANZUS and still is in Japan. On balance, however, to the extent there is any direct official interest in ANZUS, it focuses on ROK seconding for the principles of collective security with the United States and criticism of those who attack it. North Korea remains the overwhelming focus of such criticism, and any North Korean empathy for what New Zealand has done arouses suspicion about the Kiwis.

Having discounted so strongly the overt connection between anti-nuclear developments in ANZUS and the Korean peninsula, one must nonetheless note the very real parallels that exist even if most Koreans are casually unaware of them. There is a sentiment among South Koreans who are critical of U.S.-ROK security relations that the treaty endangers South Korea as much as it protects it against North Korea because of the global implications of the nuclear umbrella. This is essentially the same idea as the Japanese and Kiwis have raised. That sentiment is linked to the growing anti-Americanism in South Korea, which is much stronger and more pervasive than the counterpart in New Zealand. Also there is some sentiment among peace activists in South Korea that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula -- despite the idea's connections to North Korean and Soviet "peace campaigns" -- should be considered on its own merits. So far, it is impossible to be certain how persuasive to the broader society these sentiments may be, but the significant improvements in ROK-USSR ties and on-again/off-again improvements in ROK-DPRK ties may allow the peace activists' anti-

nuclear campaign to gain momentum. Periodic media reports that North Korea may be moving toward the development of nuclear arms capabilities seems certain to add impetus to the momentum that already exists.²⁹

There are several factors tugging at these Korean developments. Most evident are the indigenous nuclear potentials of both Korean states, either of which has to be counted among those countries which could "go nuclear." If one were to do so, the other almost certainly would follow suit regardless of any efforts by its superpower ally to dissuade it. Similarly, if one or both Korean states (or even more remotely -- a unified Korean state) were to become a nuclear armed power, there is little doubt it would alarm Japan so much that it, too, would join the game -- albeit as a player with far greater financial and technical resources. These Korean nuclear options (compounded by Japan waiting in the wings) make the Korean nuclear issue far more complex than that which New Zealand faced.

Perversely, those dangers -- and the very real risks (compared to New Zealand) that Korea could actually become engulfed in a nuclear war -- make the Kiwi style arguments appealing to some Koreans who are anxious about the stability of what passes for peace in Korea. Ironically, it is Korea's very different strategic situation and the great risks enveloping the peninsula which could make the Kiwi "virus" more infectious among Koreans. Japan is too central to world and Asian affairs to ever seriously contemplate a "stop-the-world-I-want-to-get-off" approach, but Korea (were it not for superpower involvement) could visualize such a strategic alternative. It may be far-fetched, but it is not unthinkable for Koreans to treat denuclearization and neutralization as viable steps toward the unification of their nation. That highly emotional goal

could inject a degree of fervor into Korean approaches to nuclear-free zones, leading Koreans to run risks the Japanese would not.

It would be difficult for Japanese to discount their risks in a nuclear-free zone, but Koreans might be able to do so because Korea -- divided or unified -- is not the sort of world power whose abstinence from the international balance of power would prove seriously destabilizing. Korea's tilting to one side or the other could be unsettling, but -- in the abstract -- it clearly is possible to visualize Korea as a non-participant in superpower or major power rivalries. Many Koreans -- conservatives, liberals, and radicals -- make assumptions about their existing security problems that are predicated on outsiders (the United States, the Soviet Union, and/or Japan) being the cause of their predicament. Consequently, Koreans -- especially those prone to xenophobia, as many are -- might readily try anything which would rid them of the foreign interlopers. In this context, a Kiwi-style rupture in U.S.-ROK relations is not at all unthinkable.

Making this prospect still more troubling is the corollary that such a step might give the neighboring Japanese strategic fits. While movement by Japan in that direction, and the problems it would cause the United States' collective security network (including the ROK leg of that network) would alarm present leaders in Seoul greatly, one cannot seriously expect future South Korean leaders to be similarly concerned about any alarm their hypothetical Kiwi-style actions might cause in Tokyo because of Japanese nervousness about Soviet aims in Asia, especially Northeast Asia. Actually any future Seoul government which could take such a major strategic step on the nuclear issue, knowing what it would do to U.S.-ROK relations, might well relish the difficulties it would also cause for the Japanese.

Despite these presently hypothetical reasons for visualizing the parallels between New Zealand and South Korean anti-nuclear options, one must hasten to add that there are no viable "Langes" on the ROK political horizon. South Korean politics has liberalized greatly in the late 1980s, but not enough to produce that sort of progressivism. Consequently, as one tries to estimate the prospects for the Kiwi "disease" infecting Northeast Asia, South Korea still has to be ranked the least likely to succumb -- though it is possible under certain conditions. Nevertheless, should those conditions emerge internationally South Korea might well experience anti-nuclear radicalism.

Interestingly, in Japan -- where most eyes focus looking for signs of Kiwiism -- it is easier to find such signs but those signs do not suggest Japan could be enticed to change course so dramatically. The growth of support for Ms. Doi and the Socialists *does* echo the feminism and leftism of New Zealand's Labour Party. Moreover, Kiwi actions and successes *have* put enormous pressure on Japanese leftists who were mortified by being shown up by a bit player in world affairs. Nevertheless, the combination of two unlikely scenarios -- an abject JSP defeat of the LDP and a hard-left interpretation of its anti-nuclear stance once the JSP becomes the ruling party -- is not something which should cause undue anxiety in Washington or in LDP circles. Both should, however, do their utmost to assure that both scenarios remain unlikely or U.S.-Japan relations will be in for some extraordinarily difficult times.

In only one Northeast Asian country, North Korea, is it easy to predict with confidence that something approximating "Kiwiism" will thrive. Actually that comparison, while perhaps politically useful in Northeast Asia, to stimulate an awareness of the risks in nuclear free zones, is grossly unfair to New

Zealanders because the Kiwis' motives and intentions are very different from the Kim Il-sung regime which is consciously seeking to be disruptive and destabilizing -- quite the opposite of New Zealand. With that unique exception, it is fair too say that fears of the anti-nuclear Kiwi "virus" spreading to Northeast Asia, balanced by a careful assessment of the counterweights, should be seen as exaggerated.³⁰

Kiwiism: Broadly Defined

That cannot be said with nearly as much assurance when it comes to parallels with the broader aspects of "Kiwiism" that have reshaped ANZUS and are poised to do the same to other alliances. Virtually all U.S. alliances are experiencing a period of de facto reassessment of their purposes. ANZUS was ahead of that still emerging curve, and its tripartite debate and stalemated reconfiguration was much more accessible to a broad Western public because it was carried out in English. This is happening to both the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security relationships, as well as the regional context into which they plugged. This is not a new phenomenon and stems from the same U.S.-provided stimuli that spurred the two regional ANZUS partners to rethink their proper roles and interests, namely the Nixon Doctrine which encouraged greater Asian self-reliance, and subsequent pressures for burdensharing.

Accelerated by U.S. setbacks in Vietnam, the so-called Vietnam "syndrome" among the American public, and Asian perceptions of a simultaneous decline in the relative power and influence of the U.S. as that of the East Asian states were seen to be ascending, both Tokyo and Seoul embarked on a rethinking of their overall security posture. Collectively their decisions amount to the Japanization of Japan's security and the Koreanization of the ROK's security.

Neither of these U.S. allies has, so far, gone nearly as far as New Zealand in terms of redefining their relations with the United States. A more accurate parallel is Australia's effort to reshape its role in ANZUS. All three -- Japan, the ROK, and Australia -- are unambiguous about their desire to retain the support of the United States as a foundation for their security, but they all also are clear about their intentions to do more for themselves and, by doing so, to relieve the U.S. of some of the burdens it complains about shouldering. In short, they are fulfilling the processes started by the Nixon Doctrine and answering the calls to share burdens.

Part of this process is not quite what U.S. officials have anticipated, however, because Japan and South Korea are being as assertive as Australia and New Zealand about defining what they think should occur in their alliances. This is most obvious to cogniscenti in U.S.-Japan relations where there is ample evidence that Japanese leaders expect to be part of the decisionmaking system that shapes the game plan for the team. Japanese may not want to *be* the "coach" (in Ambassador Dalrymple's terms), but they clearly want to have a strong voice in what the U.S. coach tells the team to do. Stretching that metaphor, the Japanese understand that they are paying a sizeable portion of the coach's salary directly and under the table, providing an equally sizeable portion of the equipment needed to play the game, and own a key chunk of the playing field. In short, the Japanese know, in no uncertain terms, that they are no New Zealand or Australia, but are a country which in certain respects is on a par with the United States. In other respects, they visualize themselves as ahead of the United States. Consequently, the changes which have occurred, and are occurring, in U.S.-Japan security relations are just as traumatic to U.S. dominance in the alliance as the

Kiwi challenge has been in ANZUS. Both have sent clear signals that the United States is no longer in charge the way it once was.

The key difference is that the Japanese have rarely been as confrontational toward the United States as New Zealand is.³¹ Similarly, the United States has not dared be as confrontational regarding Japan as it has been in its treatment of New Zealand. In these terms, the closer parallel may seem to be Australia's style of effecting change in ANZUS because both Japan and Australia have chosen orderly persuasion and consultation rather than drawing a line and challenging Washington to step across. Nevertheless, the truly close parallel is between the effectiveness of New Zealand's major political challenge to the United States and Japan's even larger assertion of its economic and technological right to help determine the rules of the game. It is in this sense that Tokyo has reshaped U.S.-Japan ties as clearly as the Kiwis did to ANZUS. In both relationships there has been a sea change in decisionmaking. The difference is that relatively few Americans are aware of how much the U.S.-Japan security relationship has been transformed on Japan's terms, while -- relatively speaking -- many know that New Zealand has caused ANZUS to change. In ANZUS, the United States has lost tremendous "face" at Wellington's hands and is cautiously ready to admit it and deal with it. The United States is much less ready to admit how much loss of control it has experienced in U.S.-Japan relations, but it is a very similar phenomenon.

The sense that the Cold War is ending, superpower relations are changing, and new centers and forms of power are permitting greater pluralism in the international system was very supportive of the Kiwi moves to redirect ANZUS. Those same systemic forces are exerting comparable contextual support in Northeast Asia. They allow Japan to experiment with new ideas about its

relations with the United States. Something comparable also is occurring in U.S.-ROK relations as South Korea adjusts to a far more diverse set of relations than Seoul previously enjoyed. It was long considered a relatively passive protege of the United States, or a "puppet" to those choosing to be derogatory. In any event South Korea had few options other than towing the U.S. line and being a steadfast ally. As the ROK economy grew to levels which very few Koreans ever dreamed of, and South Korea's foreign policy horizons broadened in ways that were unthinkable to its older generation of hardline anti-communists, Seoul felt its way toward a very different international milieu.

By the late 1980s, the ROK was becoming a significant actor in global economic affairs with burgeoning ties throughout Asia, North America, the Middle East, and Western Europe. It also had substantial ties with the Soviet Union, PRC, and several Eastern European countries. Of less immediate importance, but nonetheless significant for the long term, it had growing ties in South America and Africa. In short, the ROK was a changed country in many ways. To be sure, ROK security policy remained understandably preoccupied with the North Korean threat and dependent upon the United States as a backstop. Consequently, South Korean leaders could not afford to be nearly as reckless as the Kiwis in experimenting with alternative ideas about their alliance with the United States. Nor did the ROK enjoy the leverage possessed by Japan to try to persuade the U.S. to reconfigure the alliance. Nonetheless, there was movement in that direction brought about by pressures for change within the South Korean body politic (also newly experimental with pluralism) that could be vented against the United States precisely because of the same contextual freedom of action that enabled the Kiwis, Aussies, and Japanese to express their positions. In this sense the South Koreans, too, can be seen as part of a worldwide trend toward lessened

alliance cohesion which the Kiwis did not start, but took advantage of, and pressed to an extreme, thereby creating a precedent against which other alliances can be measured.

Unless the global context changes much more dramatically than most observers now anticipate, i.e., unless "peace breaks out," there is little chance that either Tokyo or Seoul will push their views on any aspect of alliance cohesion as vociferously or confrontationally as Wellington has. Northeast Asia is not a remote corner of the world. Far from it, it is one of three or four truly vital crossroads of international trade, strategy, and politics. Consequently, neither U.S. ally in the region can afford to take the sort of precipitous but calculated risks that the Kiwis could afford. Equally important, the sensitivity of the region is universally accepted among the major powers. This injects a need for prudence into these powers' policies. That quest for caution does not, however, mean that many of the same causal factors that drew New Zealand into an assertive policy posture can be deterred. Instead, they will have to be addressed and, with luck, managed skillfully.

Some of them are spinoffs of the mutual reassessment of alliance cohesion. For example, just as the United States had difficulty within ANZUS becoming a satisfactory replacement for the departed British Empire in many Aussie and Kiwi minds, so too is it struggling in Northeast Asia to stabilize its role. The United States assumed a role as the nexus for regional stability in the region for which it was poorly prepared or suited. To many Japanese the U.S.-Japan relationship served as a replacement for the Anglo-Japanese relationship of the early 20th century. Japan attempted to find its geopolitical identity in that evolutionary context. Problems arose, then and now, as Japan grew too large and influential for the constraints of such a partnership to sit well upon nationalistic

Japanese who sought then, and seek today, a larger role. Japan, to the Japanese, was a more normal pretender to that kind of role, but could not -- of course -- lay claim to it in the wake of its disastrous failure in World War II. Instead the Japanese began a long march toward a new approach to that power. Some Japanese now think they can almost grasp it, but most seem content to wait a while longer until they have a firmer understanding of what they will do with it if they get it. Nonetheless, the underlying notion that Japan could, and should, be the regional nexus -- and not a junior partner of a Western ally -- has never died out and seems resurgent today.

China, naturally, has other ideas about that hierarchy and sees itself always as the "central kingdom," in the many nuances of the phrase. Over the long term that Chinese attribute seems destined to put China once again on a course compelling it to deal with Japan. This is of broad historic significance, but for present regional purposes its significance for Korea must be addressed. For all its contemporary self-confidence, Korea has a long tradition of operating in a hierarchical context. Over the centuries China was at the pinnacle of that hierarchy. Japan forced itself to the top from the late 19th century until the defeat of the Japanese Empire. Since 1945 the ROK has been operating under the auspices of a United States-dominated hierarchy, with (after the late 1960s) Japan occupying for South Korea a position as a second tier leader immediately beneath the United States. Most Koreans were unhappy with Japan's prominence, but reluctantly accepted and worked with it.

The contextual change is altering much of this. Just as the Kiwis have had extremely serious doubts about the wisdom of following the United States' lead, and the Aussies have more hesitantly carved out a less U.S.-centered worldview, so too have Japan and South Korea been reassessing the desirability of accepting

the United States as the hub of a wheel in which they are mere spokes. Both certainly know and accept the U.S. "wheel," but they also see other wheels in international affairs. Japan is confident it is a hub, too, or perhaps part of the hub once solely identified with the United States. Few Koreans see their country as becoming that kind of central actor, but they welcome the idea that there are several hubs -- the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the European community. This pluralism of power provides Korea with opportunities to shape a multiplicity of roles that it hopes will prevent it from again being as dominated by a single entity like China, Japan, or the United States. The key element in all this is that all these states, from remote New Zealand to world leader Japan, are treating the United States in a similar manner by adjusting to what they perceive to be a relative decline in the United States' role in their, and the world's, affairs. The Kiwis were blunter in these matters because they had less to lose (and in their minds, more to gain), but they are all behaving in a like manner. To the extent the Kiwi response was more extreme, here too it can be viewed as precedent setting even if the other states were unaware that their actions conform to that precedent.

Closely related to this spinoff, because it is integral to changed perceptions by allies of the United States' role, is their shift in focus within alliances from an anti-communist motive for cooperating to an alternative motive which is far from clear yet. If the anti-communist fervor of the Cold War is to be shelved in favor of detente, conflict resolution, and other rather nebulous notions, what will constitute the geopolitical glue holding the alliances together? NATO clearly is confronting this, too, so one cannot consider it peculiar to the Pacific. ANZUS, however, faced squarely this issue of alliance vagueness long before other U.S. alliances. It was the United States' difficulty in coming to grips with this

amorphousness that helped precipitate the steps that Australia and New Zealand took.

Significantly, there are small signs that this is spreading to U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK ties too. On the surface these two alliances seem far more entrenched in their vintage anti-communist rationales. To the extent North Korea remains the primary focus of daily threat perceptions in Northeast Asia, that rationale seems intact. When one looks at the rapid improvement which occurred in the separate U.S., Japanese, and South Korean bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, and various Eastern European states, however, it becomes more difficult to couch the alliances' purposes in anti-communism. Ties are even on the upswing with Vietnam, albeit cautiously. Even the North Korean adversary has become the object of persuasive efforts aimed at moderating its ways. On balance, therefore, the anti-communist rationale for U.S. security ties in Northeast Asia is being gradually eroded by progress toward detente.

These are, obviously, trends that need support, but they also raise serious questions for the United States and its two Northeast Asian allies about how they will address the continued purposes of the alliances. Arguably, here, too, ANZUS may be pointing the way. Despite the frictions it has experienced, there remains a degree of economics-based coherence to ANZUS which should carry it through into the future. Such an approach may also be viable in U.S. "security" relations (broadly defined) with Japan and the ROK. If so, we may look back upon the transformation of ANZUS into a still more loosely defined political alignment of cooperating partners as an appropriately vague precedent for future softer alignments in Northeast Asia.

All of this movement -- past, present, and prospective -- is partially the result of important changes within the Northeast-Asian allies that are similar to what drove the Aussies and Kiwis. By far the most important factor is the rise of nationalism in Japan and South Korea. To be sure all peoples' nationalisms are unique to them, but there are cross-national parallels which keep comparative government specialists busy. One of the most intriguing is the way in which all four U.S. allies are witnessing new forms of nationalism superimposed on older forms. Just as the Aussies and Kiwis are rediscovering their roots and modifying their sense of national self, by juxtaposing themselves against the backdrop of a changing world order in which the United States' role is being altered (as Britain's was in the past), so too are the Japanese and South Koreans redefining their nationalism. In these Asian cases the task is much more complicated because the contrast between the "new" and "old" is far greater and the "old" has an extraordinarily deep grip on their national psyches. For all their surface material modernism, Asian cultural values remain pervasive. Consequently the Japanese and South Korean struggles with nationalism threaten to have a more profound impact on U.S. alliance relationships than has been true for the United States and its ANZUS partners.

For the Japanese, their sense of mythological uniqueness and of being a chosen people greatly complicates their contacts with *any* non-Japanese. Many assume this is most true of Japan-Western relations, but it may be even more troubling for Japan-Asian relations because other Asians are less tolerant of what they see as Japanese arrogance and condescension toward "lesser" peoples. In any event those deep-seated attitudes, and the legacy of pre-World War II ultra-nationalism which continues to raise its ugly head in contemporary Japanese society, certainly becloud Japanese nationalism in the 1980s. However, it is

important to remember that the Japanese of the 1980s and '90s are different from their grandparents in the '20s and '30s. How different they will be remains to be seen, but giving them the benefit of the doubt seems fully warranted as the Japanese increasingly try to assert their pride in what postwar Japan has accomplished.

Japanese national assertiveness might take many forms relevant to Japan's security, ranging from neutral pacifism to unilateral expansionism. Key to all of them across that broad spectrum is that they will be Japanese notions of what is good for Japan. Japanese pride is crucial here because it is driving the Japanese to once again confront head on something they have avoided doing for years in the postwar era -- namely determining how Japanese national interests coincide with, and differ from, those of their erstwhile American strategic benefactor, and deciding what the Japanese should do about the differences in terms of changing their policy.

It is increasingly obvious that the Japanese are reexamining their economic, political, cultural, and military interests in comparison to comparable American interests. Much less apparent to most Americans is the equally assertive ways in which their South Korean allies are behaving nationalistically. Korean actions and responses which may seem unconnected, such as strident anti-Americanism, ROK bureaucratic resistance to American pressures to open Korean markets, and ferment within the ROK military about proper U.S.-ROK command relationships, actually are facets of one society-wide development -- namely the nationalistic readiness of South Koreans to stand up to, and confront, Americans if they feel their interests are being short changed. This tendency among Koreans is real and growing. South Koreans, like the Japanese, are ready, willing, and able to take a leaf out of the Morita-Ishihara book and say "No!"

As important, when coupled with the acute consciousness on the part of Japanese and Koreans of hierarchicalism, it injects an element into U.S.-Japan-Korean relations which has distinct parallels with Australia and New Zealand's role within ANZUS. Although Korea is the junior member of the Northeast Asian triad, it too today -- like New Zealand in the past -- enjoys stature and access to power which are disproportionate to its relative size and capabilities. Clearly, South Korea's large population, world class economy, and strong armed forces make it an intrinsically far more important country than New Zealand is to the United States. No one in their right mind could consider using the New Zealander's phrase, "a symbolic pimple on the eagle's tail," to characterize the Republic of Korea's importance to the United States. Nevertheless, were Korea not in Japan's backyard, it is unlikely that Seoul would enjoy the level of influence over Washington that it does. The important point is that it *is* there and *does* possess disproportionate geopolitical clout.

Also, like New Zealand, there is a tendency within South Korea to be of two minds about ROK influence. Conservative Koreans recognize and appreciate it. More important, they assiduously cultivate it by exerting Seoul's influence through diverse bureaucratic, political, business, academic, and other contacts -- notably including a well-honed lobbying effort. Less conservative Koreans, however, share with the New Zealand left a sense that South Korea does not benefit very much from its supposed access because it is unable to alter significantly American policies toward nuclear issues, the status of U.S. forces in Korea, the role of Japan, and -- probably most important -- the pace of progress toward national unification. Consequently the theme of South Korean ability to shape its relations with the United States and to have the ear of key Americans is

debated among Koreans in ways that echo what occurred in U.S.-New Zealand relations.

Similarly, the concurrent U.S.-Japanese dialogue over what should transpire in U.S.-Japan relations echoes in the Northeast Asian context what occurred in U.S.-Australian ties within ANZUS. Even though the United States has complaints about how the Japanese in one region and the Australians in another comport themselves as allies and trade partners, it is less willing to criticize the larger regional ally than it is to criticize the smaller one -- Korea and New Zealand, respectively. Though the reasons for this reluctance differ and should be borne in mind, the results are important for their parallels. Because New Zealand and the ROK are more assertive about their policy options, each's actions has tended to put the larger U.S. ally in their regions in a comparatively favorable light and taken some of the heat off the large ally. Australia clearly benefits from this tendency more than Japan does. Moreover, Japan's past minimalist defense expenditures (prior to the yen's increase in value in the late 1980s) made the ROK appear to be a more forthcoming ally than Japan. That argument still is used by Seoul, but too less avail as American perceptions of Japan's contributions to U.S.-Japan bilateral relations grow more appreciative. On balance, the U.S. has become more willing to criticize South Korea, especially on economic and political grounds which subtly effect the tone of security cooperation.

Needless to say, U.S. relations with the ROK are far more amicable than are soured U.S.-New Zealand ties. Despite that important qualitative difference the parallel remains instructive: the United States' tendency to treat allies in a region according to a hierarchical evaluation of their worth enables the most valued ally to get away with actions that the less valued ally cannot and, in turn,

aggravates the frustration of the latter. There may not be anything the United States can do about such intra-hierarchical dynamics and frictions, but Americans should bear them in mind so that U.S. policy will show appropriate sensitivity and will not become so subject to manipulation by senior or junior allies.

This parallel is made more acute in the ANZUS case by the unusually small role New Zealand formerly played in ANZUS which enlarged the modest (in global terms) security contributions Australia made. Australia clearly benefits from the comparison. In Northeast Asia, the situation is reversed. South Korean frustrations are accentuated because its very significant security role (especially for a country of its size) tends to be overshadowed by the global stature and potentials of neighboring Japan. Japan's enormous economy and capacity to influence regional and global affairs, including the well being of the United States, make it almost impossible for the ROK to compete with Japan for the United States' attention. These qualitative differences aggravate the parallels between ANZUS and Northeast Asia. Clearly the ROK is more "vital" to the United States than New Zealand. Arguably it might even outrank Australia were U.S. officials to rank order countries by their importance to the United States. Nonetheless, and despite much boilerplate to the contrary, the ROK is not truly "vital" to the United States in the many ways that Japan warrants that description. Consequently, for all the admitted differences between South Korea and New Zealand, they both can be put in the same functional category as junior allies occupying the lowest rung on the ladder in their regional security arrangements.

Additional proof of this proposition is found in the palpable fear on the part of South Koreans that Japan's power to effect Korea's fate is greater than that of the United States over Korea because the Japanese, in the past, have proven their willingness to go out on the limb over Korean issues because Japan

perceives vital interests in Korea. The fact that Japan has not had to do so for several decades because of the United States' involvement in Korea may obscure the nature of Japan's stake in Korea, but it does not alter it. The United States might someday distance itself from involvement in Korean affairs. It probably will not, but it could.³² Japan cannot separate its destiny from that of Korea. Consequently, despite the consciously low profile maintained by Japan vis-a-vis Korea for decades, many Koreans know (and fear) that Japanese decisions about Korean issues will be more meaningful to Korea than those of the United States over the long term.

The parallel with New Zealand's perception of Australia as a more immediate big power is strong. U.S. "promises" or "threats" to Korea can be manipulated more readily by South Koreans than can the equivalent by Japan precisely because Koreans feel in their bones the centrality of Korea to Japan versus the marginality of Korea to many Americans. This could change, and some Americans and a far larger number of South Koreans are endeavoring to change it, but for the foreseeable future it is likely to influence Korean perceptions of the United States and Japan. Every time Americans behave cavalierly toward Korea, and Japanese display caution about becoming overtly reinvolved, Korean anxiety increases. The prospective end of the Cold War may worsen that anxiety if reduced U.S.-Soviet tensions in Northeast Asia effectively marginalizes Korea in the eyes of U.S. and Soviet leaders, compelling Tokyo to loom larger in Korean issues because Moscow and Washington would be less involved. Similarly, every time South Koreans take actions which appear aimed at the United States, but also have a hidden agenda vis-a-vis Japan, they underscore this problem of hierarchicalism. These interactions are very reminiscent of New Zealand's relations with its two big brothers

That tendency is reinforced when the United States stresses its tough-minded pursuit of its national interests. At the root of those interests one finds a disparity between the relative importance of Japan and Korea to Americans. However, it is the very "toughness" of U.S. policymakers who are soundly adjusting to a rapidly changing world that reveals another parallel with ANZUS. In Northeast Asia, too, U.S. allies are responding to hardnosed American policies by adopting a more cold-eyed view of the United States. Instead of considering the United States as a benevolent -- if sometimes bumbling -- partner, Japanese and South Koreans are reassessing how they should treat their superpower ally. This is most evident in trade issues. This, in turn, raises another parallel between ANZUS and United States security relations in Northeast Asia.

Problems within ANZUS certainly were not precipitated by economic frictions. Similarly, security frictions in U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK relations have distinct roots that were not originally connected to economic problems. Subsequent to the emergence of contentious security issues, however, economic frictions have aggravated the overall relationships. Despite the utmost efforts of U.S. and allied leaders to keep them separate, they have blended and contaminated each other. The linkages are growing in ways that threaten (or promise, depending upon ones perspective) to exacerbate the chances for resolving either security or economic problems. While such interactions have become widely noted in U.S.-Northeast Asian relations because of the high visibility of U.S.-Japan economic disputes, and the growing visibility of U.S.-South Korean economic problems, they are no less important for the future of ANZUS where they impose new animosities on old frustrations.³³

As is true of ANZUS, both Northeast Asian allies are adjusting to U.S. toughness on trade and defense burdensharing by reevaluating the changed circumstances and reconsidering what purpose their alliances with the United States are supposed to serve. Signs of these shifts are evident in the differences in how each of the three countries perceives regional threats and contemplates means to cope with them. The United States tends to still see regional threats in military and superpower terms, whereas Japan and South Korea are gradually edging away from that worldview and toward broader terms of reference embodied by Tokyo's label -- "comprehensive security." Seoul does not use that title for its policy, but South Korea, too, is moving in that direction as evidenced by its movement toward improved ties with "socialist" states and more open appreciation for the economic benefits of lower defense spending made possible by the U.S. commitment to the ROK

This is not to suggest that either the U.S.-Japan or U.S.-ROK security relationship are unraveling in the way some see the ANZUS pact collapsing. Part of the reason for this is that both Japan and Korea devote great energy to sustaining U.S. confidence in existing commitments. The United States, too, pays serious attention to these allies' perception of U.S. credibility. On balance, these interactions are more successful than those within ANZUS, regardless of language and cultural barriers. This is so despite the presence in Northeast Asia, too, of the same sort of false expectations, dialogue of the deaf, and misplaced cultivation of already converted groups in each other's societies, which plague U.S.-New Zealand relations in ANZUS. These are, so far, not as serious in Northeast Asia, but they could become more dicey.

Perversely this is more of a problem in Japanese and ROK policy toward the United States than vice versa. Japanese and South Koreans pay far more attention to the United States than Americans do to them. In general, this difference benefits them and hurts the United States. In that sense the Northeast Asian alliances display parallels with ANZUS. However, despite the relatively low level of attention and expertise the United States devotes to Japan and South Korea, Americans have managed to avoid becoming too misled by these problems. That is much less true of Japan and, especially, South Korea. The basic reason for this is that it is easier for Americans to grasp who speaks for relatively centralized societies such as Japan and the ROK. That is not true for Japanese and South Koreans who must make sense out of a multiplicity of voices in the United States. Often they waste and duplicate their efforts. The United States, on the other hand, dissipates what could be an advantage by being prone to targeting for persuasion those Japanese and Koreans who -- by education and experience -- already are fairly well disposed toward U.S. interests.

CONCLUSION

The Lange government purposely threw down its gauntlet in 1984, when it announced a non-nuclear policy that banned nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed U.S. naval vessels from New Zealand ports. Perhaps to Wellington's surprise, Washington met the challenge head on. The United States figuratively picked up the gauntlet and threw it back at Lange's feet. To some Kiwis the vehemence of the United States' response seemed more like the gauntlet was slapped across their collective faces. That vehemence was the result of a sense of betrayal among key Americans. If New Zealand would not accept the U.S. Navy on American terms,

but terms that served the common interests of all U.S. allies, it could not expect to retain the benefits of the ANZUS pact.

Accordingly, in August 1986 the United States effectively terminated its defense ties with New Zealand. Though ANZUS persists as a formal treaty, its provisions have been put in limbo. In functional terms it no longer operates trilaterally. The United States appears ready to wait until New Zealand reverses its policy. To many Kiwis there is a greater prospect of hell freezing over. Washington clearly fears the spillover damage which acceptance of Lange's, and now Palmer's, demands might inflict on other U.S. treaty relationships. Wellington, in turn, seems intent on being more patient (or obstinate, depending on one's perspective) than Washington. As a result of this stalemate, the erstwhile partners can be viewed as amicably separated, but not contemplating divorce despite evidently irreconcilable differences.

There is little room for compromise. In all probability, one side must yield to the other. If Wellington yields, ANZUS would be restored to the status quo ante. That relationship, though battered, would surely recover its former harmony. However, what would happen if the United States were to accept New Zealand's non-nuclear principles? Short of a dramatic transformation of superpower relations, in which the United States would no longer have reason to be concerned about threats to its maritime-based national strategy, we will never receive a positive answer to that question. Virtually all mainstream U.S. defense and foreign policy analysts remain supportive of the nuclear component of the United States' deterrence posture and its essential naval portions. If the United States were to acquiesce to New Zealand, it could scarcely say "no" elsewhere. Consequently, the dangers of Japan, South Korea, or other Asian states becoming infected with the Kiwi "virus" -- even if commonly exaggerated -- must remain a

valid concern for U.S. officials. It is only by retaining that focus, despite substantial popular American empathy for the New Zealand viewpoint, that the United States will be able to stay the course which remains essential for its national strategy.

NOTES

1. In addition to the various other studies cited throughout the remainder of this study, see the following books and monographs:

a) On ANZUS:

Henry S. Albinski, ANZUS, the United States, and Pacific Security. Lanham, MD: The Asia Society/University Press of America 1987; Dora Alves, Anti-Nuclear Attitudes in New Zealand and Australia. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985; Jacob Bercovitch, Editor. ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management in International Affairs. New York: St. Martins Press, 1988; Joseph A. Camilleri, The Australian, New Zealand, U.S. Alliance; Regional Security in the Nuclear Age. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987; and Andrew Mack, "Denuclearization in Australia and New Zealand," Working Papers, No. 52, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University.

b) On Australian policy in the ANZUS context:

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2. However, the author has written some short pieces on the ANZUS issue. See his "Adding a J to ANZUS," The New York Times, May 13, 1981; "Anti-nuclear posturing: New Zealand vs. Japan," The Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 1985; "New Zealand: The Mouse that Roared (and was heard!)," Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1985; and "Denuclearization: What's in it for Asia?," The Asian Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1987.

3. A Companion analysis by Dr. David Winterford (of the Naval Postgraduate School) on ANZUS and Southeast Asian security, which was conducted as a corollary of this research project, will be published as a separate Technical Report at a later date. The South Pacific region is beyond the scope of the terms of reference of the research project and was well covered by a 1989 NDU study. See "Workshop and Conference May 17-19, 1989 on Strategic Cooperation and Competition in the Pacific Islands," Washington: National Defense University War Gaming and Simulation Center. For additional background see also: George K. Tanham and Eleanor S. Wainstein, "Security Trends in the South Pacific: Vanuatu and Fiji," Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, November 1988; Andrew Mack, "Nuclear Allergy: New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Stance and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone," Working Papers No. 26, Peace Research Centre, Australia National University; and F. A. Mediansky, "Nuclear Weapons and Security in the South Pacific," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1986, pp. 31-43. For insights on the Soviet Union's perspective on this region, see George K. Tanham, "The Soviet Union in the South Pacific," Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, April 1988.

4. When the Palmer administration took office it pointedly emphasized its willingness to improve relations with the United States and adopt a somewhat milder tone, even though it equally pointedly stressed it would not change its anti-nuclear position. The latter was stressed by the inclusion of Helen Clark, who was one of the architects of New Zealand's nuclear policy shift in 1985, in the Palmer cabinet. See The New Zealand Herald (Auckland) September 12, 1989, p. 1.; The Evening Post (Wellington) September 12, 1989, p. 1, the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) August 17, 1989, pp. 10-11; and The Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1989, p. 3. The United States subsequently rejected Wellington's overtures, Los Angeles Times wire service report, The Herald (Monterey) November 4, 1989, p. 44. For a succinct presentation of a conservative American rebuttal to New Zealand's position, see: Richard D. Foster, "Dealing With Wayward New Zealand," The Heritage Foundation, Asian Studies Center Background, April 21, 1989.
5. Interview in TIME, November 13, 1989, p. 60.
6. Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, op. cit.. See also, Ross Babbage, Looking Beyond the Dibb Report and Desmond J. Ball, Notes on Paul Dibb's Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities. Both Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986.
7. One New Zealander, Jock Phillips, bitingly reacted to his country's relative insignificance by calling New Zealand in ANZUS "but a pimple, indeed a purely symbolic pimple, on the tail of a very large eagle," in his "New Zealand and the ANZUS alliance - Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1947-88," presented at the East-West Center, August 24-26, 1988.
8. At the same time as the then new Palmer government made overtures to the United States it also underscored once more its intention to carve out a special role for New Zealand in the South Pacific region even if that meant making adjustments in its limited governmental resources which would require paying less attention to such traditional areas of interest as Europe. See: The Evening Post (Wellington) September 12, 1989, p. 3 and The New Zealand Herald (Auckland) September 12, 1989, p. 1.
9. Australia's role in creating the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization, and initial reservations about the United State as a member, point to these ambiguities. See FEER, November 16, 1989, pp. 10-19.

10. For useful survey of the broader interactions within ANZUS, see the Summary of the "Conference on Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: Changing Societies, Politics, and National Self-Images," Honolulu: East-West Center, Resource Systems Institute, International Relations Program, August 24-26, 1988. In particular see the insightful paper by Jock Philipps, "New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance - Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1947-88," op. cit.

11. Including some cited in note 1.

12. For useful coverage of the ANZAC frigates issues, see Peter Jennings, "The ANZAC frigates: a vital choice for New Zealand," the New Zealand International Review, March/April 1989, pp. 2-7; Denis McLean and Desmond Ball, "The ANZAC Ships," Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australia National University, 1989; Andrew Mack, "A Case Against the ANZAC Frigates," Pacific Research, August 1989, pp. 6-7 & 9; the Canberra Times, September 8, 1989, p. 3; and FEER, August 24, 1989, p. 14 and September 21, 1989, p. 14.

13. For useful background on the ANZAC leg of ANZUS after the latter's rupture, see Lt. V.B. Hyam, RAN, "Australian and New Zealand Political and Security Relationships in the New ANZUS Era. The Implications and Consequences to Australia in Terms of Alliance Relations," Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, February 1989, pp. 17-24; Richard Baker, "ANZUS on two legs?" FEER, May 25, 1989, pp. 30-31; and Alan Burnett and Peter Jennings, "The Future of Australia/New Zealand relations," The Australian Quarterly, Autumn 1989, pp. 33-49. On a related topic the pressures on the ANZAC leg of ANZUS have strained Australian and New Zealand's abilities to provide relatively self-reliant defenses. See The Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1989, p. 4; Peter Jennings, "New Zealand Force Modernization: Problems and Prospects," Asian Defence Journal, March 1989, pp. 50-60; and his "Exercise Golden Fleece and the New Zealand Military: Lessons and Limitations" forthcoming from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.

14. FEER, May 4, 1989, p. 29 and TIME, May 8, 1989, p. 45.

15. Andre Siegfried, Democracy in New Zealand. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1914.

16. The author visited several individuals and groups active in the New Zealand peace movement and received the strong impression that these are

sincere and dedicated people with a profound sense of mission. They shared a moral certitude that their successful efforts were pace-setting. The New Zealand peace movement's brochures (as of 1989) reflected that fervor, such as the New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies' "Coping with Conflict," "Writing a Peace-Full Charter," and "One Day's Military Spending for Peacemaking" which urges readers to "enhance New Zealand's role as an international peacemaker."

17. The Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1989, p. 6.

18. For Dalrymple's speech see his "On being a superpower's ally: The Case of Australia," presented at the Southern Center for International Studies (Atlanta), June 27, 1986. Text provided by Embassy of Australia, Washington.

19. The Kiwi virus' potential to spread quickly became a source of anxiety to Washington. See, for example, Secretary of State Shultz's concerns in The Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1986, p. 12. See also a Monitor advertisement by the Soviet Union specifying Mikhail Gorbachev's plans to eliminate nuclear weapons, partially through nuclear free zones, January 21, 1987, pp. 18-19.

20. The author examined those Japanese perceptions in his U.S.-Japan Strategy Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

21. Mainichi Shimbun, May 18, 1981, pp. 2-3, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Vol. 4, May 18, 1981, p. C13. See also Reischauer's explanation of the controversy in The Washington Post, June 5, 1981, p. 17.

22. See for example, FBIS, IV, January 9, 1985, p. C1; January 10, 1985, p. C1; January 13, 1985, p. C5; January 28, 1985, p. C2; February 5, 1985, p. C1; February 6, 1985, p. C1; and February 19, 1985, p. C1.

23. Those parallels were closely followed in Australia and New Zealand. See, for example, The Age (Melbourne), August 31, 1989, p. 1 and The Evening Post (Wellington), September 12, 1989, p. 12 for coverage of Takako Doi's nuclear intentions regarding the United States.

24. Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 107.

25. For background on the burdensharing debate regarding Japan, see again the author's U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity, op. cit. and its updated Japanese version under the title Nichi-bei boei keizai rinke-ji ron (Japan-U.S. Defense Economic Linkage Theory) Tokyo: Jichosha, 1990.
26. For examples of North Korean sympathies with anti-nuclear sentiments during the formative phase of the ANZUS breakup, see, FBIS, Vol. 4, May 23, 1983, p. D2; January 23, 1984, pp. D14-15; July 19, 1984, pp. D1-5; April 22, 1985, p. D12; July 21, 1986, pp. D7-11; August 1, 1986, pp. D1-2; November 13, 1986, pp. D1-3; April 2, 1987, p. D4; FEER, July 31, 1986, p. 7; and Democratic People's Republic Of Korea Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 36, July 3, 1984.
27. A written and verbal survey by the author, in the summer and fall of 1989, of South Korean scholars who normally work on related international and security issues, discovered no evidence of anyone working on ANZUS or Kiwi-related topics. Similarly discussions with Australian and New Zealand scholars and officials in the same time frame discovered no indication of South Korean interest.
28. Among the many public references to the alleged presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, the most detailed and explicit is Peter Hayes' "American Nuclear Dilemma in Korea" presented at the Council for U.S.-Korea Security Studies annual meeting, December 3, 1987. See also Hayes' "Disarming Korea," paper presented at the Institute for Global Security Studies, Seattle, September 6, 1989.
29. The Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1989, p. 1.
30. This does not, of course, mean that Western activists in favor of promulgating nuclear free zones, and closely related naval arms control, in and around Japan and Korea will relent. On the contrary, New Zealand-based successes and prospects for comparable success in Northeast Asia appear to have whetted their appetites. See, for example, two representative papers with the same title presented, September 16-19, 1989, at a conference on "The Pacific Community: A Common security agenda for the 90s." Both were entitled "Reversing the Naval Arms Race in the Pacific" by, respectively, Dr. Hiromichi Umebayashi (Japanese representative for the Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas) and Drs. Charles A. Meconis and Michael Wallace from the conference sponsor, the Institute for Global Security Studies. See, also, Andrew Mack, "Arms Control in the North Pacific," Problems and Prospects, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, March 15, 1988. Less academic,

but more persistent, are the various efforts and publications of Greenpeace's "Campaign to Stop the Nuclear Arms Race at Sea." See, for example, its 1989 brochure "Nuclear Free Seas." For a far more balanced assessment of the prospects for change in these areas from a knowledgeable Australian researcher, see Ross Babbage, "The Future of the United States' Maritime Strategy and the Pacific Military Balance," presented at a "Conference on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region," Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, May 19-21, 1988. Illustrative of the global interest in Asia's nuclear-free sentiments is Francois Godement, Editor. Le Desarmement Nucleaire en Asie. Paris: Masson / L'Institut Francais des relations internationales, 1990.

31. Some Japanese long have urged such a confrontational approach in Tokyo's dealings with the United States. The most graphic public example of this was the bootleg English translation, in mid-1989 by an unknown source, of a nationalistic Japanese analysis by Sony chairman Morita Akio and a rightwing Liberal Democratic Party leader, Ishihara Shintaro, which caused a major behind the scenes flap.

32. See, for example, the arguments of Doug Bandow, "Leaving Korea," Foreign Policy, Winter 1989-90, pp. 77-93.

33. FEER, August 17, 1989, pp. 68-72 and The Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 1989, p. 4 and October 5, 1989, p. 4

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